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Abstract 
 
Ever since Sweden was the first Western democracy to officially recognise the People’s 
Republic of China shortly after its establishment in 1949, the two states have enjoyed decades 
of successful and beneficial bilateral cooperation. However, the literature states that 
maintaining bilateral cooperation with a growing authoritarian great power has generated an 
ambivalence from Sweden on sensitive issues regarding China, in order to not jeopardize 
domestic economic interests. This has been brought to a head, when the Chinese embassy in 
Stockholm has exerted pressure on independent journalists, in order to influence their 
reporting of China. The overall purpose of this study is to gain a deeper and further 
understanding of how power asymmetry between Sweden and China can affect how the case 
of the Chinese embassy exerting pressure on journalists will be managed from a national 
level. Part of the purpose is also to gain and provide insights and knowledge of the Chinese 
pressure from the perspective of Swedish journalists. By interviewing journalists and 
researchers, and applying a theoretical framework of primarily sharp, soft power and hard 
power and interdependence, the findings of the study  show that journalists have increased 
their reporting of China as a response to the pressure and that they perceive measures to 
counter the pressure on an EU-level as essential. The findings also show that Sweden is likely 
to continue a pragmatic approach in dealing with the embassy’s pressure, which ultimately 
means trying balance between upholding internal democratic values while maintaining good 
economic relations.  
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1 Introduction 
 
China’s increased global presence is currently perceived as one of the greatest challenges in 
international politics. Its economic and technological influence has, over the past four 
decades, developed to the extent that it’s now to be considered a global great power, and a 
driving force in a changing world order (Michalski & Pan, 2015; Xinbo, 2018; Walker, 2016). 
China’s authoritarian government has long been an issue of concern to western liberal 
democracies, who have hoped to influence China in accommodating to liberal democratic 
ideals through international cooperation (Michalski, 2013; Wong, 2019).  
Sweden, being one such democracy, has had ties with China going back centuries. After 
Sweden was the first Western democracy to officially recognise the People’s Republic of 
China shortly after its establishment in 1949, the two states deepened their diplomatic 
relations and cooperation further (Bexell, 2000; Leijonhufvud, 2016; Lagerkvist, et al. 2015). 
Since then, a number of exchanges ranging from environmental technology, civil society and 
research have been established, and there are approximately ten thousand Swedish companies 
in trade with China (Lagerkvist et al., 2015; Hellström 2014). The long and extensive history 
between Sweden and China have continuously, and triumphantly, been highlighted during 
state visits by Swedish as well as Chinese government officials and representatives. At 
ceremonial occasions, representatives for the Chinese Communist Party have referred to 
Sweden as “a good, old friend” (Leijonhufvud, 2016, 3, 7). Similarly, Anna Michalski (2013; 
889) describes that the early recognition of the PRC, and the establishment of diplomatic ties 
that followed the recognition has generated the two profoundly different states to share “a 
special relationship”.  
However, maintaining decades of bilateral cooperation with a growing authoritarian great 
power has not always been an easy task for Sweden, who have invested in projects to spur the 
growth of civil society in China, in order to steer it towards a more democratic governing 
(Lagerkvist et. al, 2015). Lagerkvist et. al (ibid.) and Michalski (2013) argue that the 
relationship from Sweden’s part has to a great extent been categorized by a balancing between 
the normative, humanitarian values to which Sweden since long has committed itself to 
uphold (Carlson-Rainer, 2017), and the economic, material interests that the Swedish 
economy rests upon. This balancing act has caused an ambivalence from Swedish policy 
makers when dealing with sensitive issues concerning China, such as not calling it a 
dictatorship, in order not to jeopardize the good diplomatic relationship (Leijonhufvud, 2016).  
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Maintaining the balancing between normative and material(economic) interests has, according 
to Lagerkvist et. al (2015; 80, 82) become increasingly more difficult as China has increased 
in power to the extent where it’s difficult to influence China on normative issues. Thus, 
Lagerkvist et. al (ibid.) argues, Sweden has relied more on the EU to push the human rights 
issues concerning China and focused more on the economic ties (Leijonhufuvd, 2017).  
However, Sweden has witnessed its great power friend’s authoritarian practices being 
translated into an assertive and dominant foreign policy. During the last couple of years, 
China has strategically adopted methods of sharp power to influence and exert pressure on the 
free media in multiple democracies, including Sweden (Cook, 2013; Walker et al. 2020; 
Kainz Rognerud, 2020). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exerting pressure and 
exhortations on reporters, journalists and media organizations all around the world, in order to 
induce self-censorship. Its punitive foreign policy has resulted in denying VISA grants, threats 
and harassment of foreign reporters, in order to limit unfavourable reporting and to 
manipulate the international discourse on China (ibid.).  
Since early 2018, the Chinese embassy in Stockholm has released statements on their website, 
attempting to discredit the Swedish media (Jerdén & Bohman, 2019). Moreover, Swedish 
journalists and news organizations have received multiple e-mails and letters from the 
embassy with criticism and attempts of influencing their reporting and verbal attacks on 
individual reporters (Kainz Rognerud, 2020). These events hit a critical point in late 2019, 
when the Swedish PEN organization announced that the Tucholsky-prize, a prize for 
persecuted journalists and publishers, would be awarded the Chinese-Swedish publisher Gui 
Minhai, detained in China since 2015 (Jerdén & Bohman, 2019). At this point, the Chinese 
ambassador stated in an interview that if the Minister for Culture would allow the prize to be 
awarded Gui Minhai, they would have to “take countermeasures” (Bråstedt, et al. 2019), and 
in another with Svenska Dagbladet (Majlard, 2019) he stated that “normal cultural exchange 
will be severely hindered”. The Minister for Culture was also threatened with being banned 
from entering China (ibid.). The Chinese ambassador also expressed that the relationship 
between Sweden and China is “not normal” (Knutsson, 2019). 
Following these events, the Chinese ambassador has been summoned to the Foreign Ministry, 
not much has been said on behalf of the Swedish government, except for a few brief 
comments. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has agreed on the account of the Chinese 
ambassador, stating that relations are currently not good but that it’s still important to have 
good relations with China (ibid.). In January 2020, an organization named Utgivarna (2020) 
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released an open letter to the Swedish government, signed by two dozen journalists, where it’s 
stated that they demand that the government should mark firmly against the pressure and that 
the issue should be raised on an EU-level. 
  
1.1 Research questions, aims and purposes 
 
In light of these events, it’s relevant to further explore the pressure exerted from the Chinese 
embassy in Stockholm and Sweden’s response to these. It’s evident that Sweden’s active 
stance on the Gui Minhai-case, and the active media reporting on this case and China’s 
internal affairs has triggered the Chinese embassy and ultimately sparked a precursor to a 
potential diplomatic crisis. Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine and analyse the 
pressure from the Chinese embassy in the context of Sweden’s balancing act between 
interests, i.e. Sweden’s ambivalence in dealing sensitive matters in relation to China without 
jeopardizing good economic relations. 
An important aspect of this issue is that of the power asymmetry in the relationship between 
the two states; China is an authoritarian communist great power, who currently is the world’s 
second largest economy, while Sweden is a small export-dependent liberal democracy 
(Lagerkvist et. al, 2015). Further, in the firing line of the pressure exerted from the Chinese 
embassy are Swedish journalists. It’s therefore relevant to examine the pressure from the 
Chinese embassy from journalists’ perspective, which will provide a deeper understanding of 
journalists in democracies being subjected to sharp power. 
 
Thus, this thesis will be guided by the following questions;  
 
1. How have journalists from the Swedish press corps internally responded to the pressure exerted by the 
Chinese embassy, and how do they perceive measures to counter this pressure on an EU-level? 
 
2. How and to what extent could power asymmetry and Sweden’s previous ambivalence in dealing with 
China affect how Sweden will manage and respond to the pressure from the Chinese embassy?  
 
The overall purpose of this study is to gain a deeper and further understanding of power 
asymmetry and how this ultimately can affect how the case of the Chinese embassy exerting 
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pressure on journalists will be managed by Sweden from a national level. Part of the purpose 
is also to gain and provide insights and knowledge of the Chinese pressure from the 
perspective of Swedish journalists. 
It should therefore also be noted that the main argument and point of departure throughout this 
thesis is that Sweden’s balancing act towards China is a result of power asymmetry between 
the two states. More specifically, the power asymmetry creates a dependency from Sweden’s 
part in that Sweden’s economy has been and is still greatly benefited from export with China.  
In order to fulfil the purpose and answer the research questions, interviews will be conducted 
with elite interviews with journalists and researchers. Because the research questions and the 
thesis deal with power, I will be using Nye’s (1990) and Walker’s (2016, 2018) framework on 
soft and sharp power, which enable the analysis of states’ (inter-)dependency, power 
asymmetry and democratic resilience to sharp power. 
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1.2 Structure 
 
The thesis is structured as follows; Firstly, an historical overview on the initial ties settled 
between Sweden and China is provided, mainly to set the context of how Sweden-China 
relations have developed over time. The literature review progresses with a closer look at 
Sweden’s approach on dealing with normative and material interests in relations to China, 
current relations and China’s attempts to influence and exert pressure on the media of 
different democracies. During this chapter, I also critically assess and discuss the literature.  
The thesis progresses with chapter three, where I introduce, define and discuss theoretical 
concepts. In chapter four, which is methodology, I introduce and discuss the chosen method 
and research design, interview samples, the case and assess research criteria. In this chapter, I 
also describe of how my interviews were conducted and how I will analyse them. In chapter 
five, I present and analyse the data I’ve gathered from my interviews by applying the 
theoretical framework. Every section in this chapter also contains a brief summary. Chapter 
six provides a summary of all the findings from the previous chapter and I discuss these in 
relation to my research questions. Finally, a conclusion will be provided in chapter seven, 
along with suggestions for further studies. 
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2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Historical overview of Sweden – China 
 
2.1.1 Swedish East India Company 
 
Sweden’s cooperation with China began with the Swedish East India Company, and dates 
back to the 18th century. Originating from the idea that Sweden could still establish itself as a 
European great power and with the aim to establish links with Asia, the company was 
actualized 1731 (Regeringen, 2019; Åberg, 1990). It settled the first ties between Sweden and 
Asia, with a primary focus on the Chinese market and provided goods such as tea, spices and 
porcelain. The company operated large scale, monopolistic and was very much a reflection of 
the prevailing time’s mercantilist views; trade activities were limited to re-exporting only, and 
unlike its global competitors, the company didn’t seek further than to secure domestic 
economic interests (Åberg, 1990; 99 – 101, 107). Views on whether Sweden gained any 
cultural influences through its initial ties with China are contested, mainly due to the fact that 
Sweden could have gained these potential influences indirectly through ties with other 
countries, such as France or Britain. The scientific evidence concerning the company’s impact 
on the general domestic economy are also inconclusive, but the company did, according to 
Åberg (ibid.), nevertheless represent a change in domestic market activities. Moreover, as a 
result of foreign investment and work force in the company, they also probably contributed to 
the integration of different domestic markets on a global level. This is particularly interesting, 
considering that the company allegedly aimed solely at domestic economic objectives.  
 
2.1.2 The recognition of the People’s Republic of China 
 
 
Much later, in 1950, Sweden became the first Western country to formally acknowledge the 
People’s Republic of China (Henceforth China) (Lagerkvist et al., 2015; 14; Bexell, 2000). 
This was considered an important move to secure good relations and because of already 
established investments through Swedish corporations in China (Leijonhufvud, 2016). 
However, it was well calculated on behalf of the Swedish government to stand by and follow 
the moves of other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and other 
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Scandinavian countries (Leijonhufvud, 2016; Bexell, 2000; 8 – 11, 23 - 24). Since this was 
outplayed in the post-war era, the division between the East and the West was significant in 
how countries acted concerning the recognition of China; the UK sought to seize the 
opportunity to bring China closer to the West, while Sweden along with its Scandinavian 
neighbours wanted to form a neutral bloc between the East and the West (Bexell, 2000; 22 – 
23). Interestingly, the UK and the other Scandinavian countries were among the first few 
countries to declare their recognition of China. China however, accepted Sweden’s 
recognition before the others’, because Sweden was first to meet the full demands of a formal 
recognition. This was appreciated in the Chinese government to the extent that, the then Head 
of State, Mao Zedong personally greeted the Swedish ambassador and received the letters of 
credence (ibid).  
Bexell (2000; 24 – 26) describes the process of China accepting the recognition from other 
countries as ‘the recognition of the recognition’ and argues that this was a result of China’s 
feelings of inferiority. The last thing China wanted was to be seen as a regime dependent on 
other states’ approval. Also, the Chinese regime wouldn’t grant foreign representatives 
diplomatic status unless they proved that they dissociated themselves from the former 
Kuomintang regime. To conclude, the new leadership in China emphasised, or demanded 
equality, loyalty and respect for sovereignty in their future diplomatic relations and evidently, 
Sweden was first to provide this. 
 
2.1.3 Achieving long-term cooperation 
 
 
During the years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, trade activities with China were low, as 
well as with the overall cooperation between the two countries. Sweden did, however, over 
the years show their loyal support for China’s seat in the UN, despite pressure from the United 
States (Bexell, 2000; 20 – 23). Leijonhufvud (2016) states that a pivotal moment for the future 
relations between Sweden and China came in 1971, when the Swedish Minister of Industry 
visited Peking. The visit came shortly after China had gradually started to open up to the 
world and aimed at planning a Swedish industrial exhibition being conducted the following 
year. Perhaps it was the fact that the Swedish government acted as fast as they did, the support 
of China’s seat in the UN, or it was the visit itself that marked a new beginning for many 
years of beneficial cooperation ahead between the two states. Hereinafter, Swedish enterprise 
has played a crucial part in political exchanges between Sweden and China. For instance, 
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China has reached technological advancement through its close ties with Swedish (and other 
Scandinavian) corporations, which has greatly benefited their economic growth (Hellström, 
2014; Wong, 2019). Similarly, Sweden has enjoyed domestic economic growth through 
expanding its export market in China (Lagerkvist et al., 2015; 79 – 80). At present day, 
exchanges between the two states range from areas such as technological and environmental 
development to higher education (ibid.). 
 
2.2 Defining current relations and challenges 
 
2.2.1 Incentives 
 
The early bilateral ties between Sweden and China have continuously been highlighted during 
state visits by Swedish as well as Chinese officials (Lagerkvist et al., 2015). For instance, 
Chinese leaders have often referred to Sweden as a “lao pengyou”, meaning “a good, old 
friend” (Leijonhufvud, 2016). Similarly, Anna Michalski (2013) notes that their historical 
connections have earned them “a special relationship”, and it can be argued that this has 
served them well. Lagerkvist et al. (2015; 81- 82) describes the benefits that the two countries 
draw on each other; China’s main objectives with engaging in bilateral cooperation with 
Sweden is and has been technological improvement, where Sweden historically has been in 
the front line (Wong, 2019). As part of China’s rise to global power, it also seeks to increase 
its foreign influence, e.g. in the Arctic region, which has been fairly successful given that 
China now has observer status in the Arctic Council. For Sweden, the main objectives remain 
economic, i.e. further export activities in China. Apart from economic growth, Sweden also 
aims at cultural exchanges and stimulating the growth of a civil society in China (ibid). The 
aim to stimulate the growth of Chinese civil society is part of a more general objective to 
promote human rights and democracy, which is argued to be more successful when engaging 
in trade activities (Bengtsson, 2020; Michalski, 2013; Wong, 2019). As will be explored in the 
following section, promoting human rights while maintaining good diplomatic relations with 
China is not necessarily an easy task for Sweden. 
 
2.2.2 A balancing act 
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Sweden is a small export-dependent democracy, but its historically neutral position and 
generous foreign aid has contributed to Sweden being regarded as a “humanitarian 
superpower” (Lagerkvist, et al. 2015; Carlson-Rainer, 2017). Therefore, it might be expected 
that Sweden will always come to human rights’ defence. However, Michalski (2013; 894 - 
895) states that in regard to China, Sweden has always had to tread carefully concerning these 
normative interests. To state an example of this, Michalski (ibid.) uses the discussions on 
lifting the arms embargo against China in 1989, during which the Swedish Parliament were 
initially divided, because of the human rights situation in China at the time being. The 
opposition eventually caved and agreed to lifting the embargo, because they didn’t want to 
jeopardize Swedish export market and China’s cooperation with the EU. According to 
Michalski (ibid.), the different governments in Sweden over the years have all had to make 
sure to not make decisions that would anger the Chinese government. She ultimately state that 
the relationship between Sweden and China is characterized by the fact that “Sweden’s policy 
towards China, just as Denmark’s, is torn between upholding professed values and norms and 
securing economic interests” (2013; 894).  
Lagerkvist et al. (2015; 83) notes that Sweden today has a different approach to normative 
interests in China, i.e. not being too vocal in its criticism about human rights issues, and to let 
it be dealt with on an EU-level. The contradiction lies within Sweden’s alignment with the 
EU-level; Jerdén and Bohman (2019; 3) state that Sweden has, domestically, refrained from 
commenting and acting on contested views with China but is simultaneously one of the most 
prominent actors within the work of the EU to actively promote human rights issues and 
democracy in Chinese society. Indeed, the Swedish government is aligned with the EU; in the 
Swedish government’s strategy on China, it’s stated that ”The EU is our most important 
foreign policy arena and a strong and united EU is crucial in ties with China” (Regeringen, 
Skr. 2019/20:18).  
It has become increasingly difficult for both Sweden and other small EU member states to 
influence China on normative principles (Lagerkvist et. al, 2015). Sweden’s foreign aid to 
China has decreased dramatically over the years as China has been able to recover from 
extreme poverty and have instead risen to be the world’s second largest economy 
(Regeringen, 2019; Walker, 2016). Lagerkvist et. al (2015; 81) also claim that after decades of 
benefiting from Sweden’s technological advancements, it is argued that China is catching up 
and might even have overtaken Sweden in this area. Moreover, some of the literature on 
Sweden – China and the EU – China relations state a concern that China is now too powerful 
to influence. Surely, the EU is still of great importance for China to remain as the global 
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power it has become (Michalski & Pan, 2015; 6), but for smaller democracies such as 
Sweden, it is undeniably difficult to be the constant upholder of human rights while engaging 
with China. Consequently, it’s no wonder why Sweden has aligned with the EU in its China-
strategy. Interestingly, Sweden has for long been known for its solid beliefs in human rights, 
peace and democracy (Carlson-Rainer, 2017), and has yet refrained from criticism of these 
issues in relations to China. What can be interpreted from this is that maintaining the 
balancing between different interests has become too difficult for Sweden which explains the 
alignment on the EU. This also indicates the power asymmetry between Sweden and China, 
that evidently has increased over the decades as China grew stronger. Nevertheless, as of the 
present time, China is still attempting to execute its internal authoritarian practices within 
Sweden, and as a sovereign state, surely it must fight the pressure from the Chinese embassy 
on two fronts; in the EU and at home. 
As argued, China’s current economic and political position in the world indicates a shift in 
power in the relations between Sweden and China and is potentially challenging the notion 
that Sweden could successfully promote liberal democratic values when interacting with 
China. It’s worth noting, however that Lagerkvist et al. (2015; 79) and Hellström (2014; 10) 
claim that despite the many differences between Sweden and China this has not (yet) impacted 
their diplomatic and economic interactions. Firstly, Lagerkvist and Hellström put this 
argument forward five to six years ago, which was before the pressure from the Chinese 
embassy on the Swedish press started. And while it’s still uncertain whether the threats from 
the ambassador will be executed, the relationship has successively declined. Secondly, 
Lagerkvist et. al (2015; 81) state in the same article that the Confucius Institute at Stockholm 
University was disused after it received too much criticism for spreading state sponsored 
propaganda, which should be considered as, at least, an indicator of conflicting interests. 
Thirdly, Göran Leijonhufvud (2016; 7) claims that despite Sweden and China’s history of 
good ties and cooperation, it hasn’t been in either Sweden’s or China’s favour when it has 
really mattered. However, and interestingly, Hellström (2014; 10-11) also presents findings of 
interviews with Chinese officials, which stated that they have a positive perception of the 
Nordic countries, mainly because the Nordic countries are less suspicious of China, in contrast 
to other western countries, and that cooperation with the Nordic countries is more “smooth” 
than with the US and the UK. Further, Hellström (ibid.) presents findings of a survey based on 
a random sample in the Chinese population showed that the Nordic countries are perceived as 
“successfully balancing social, environmental and economic achievements.” (2014; 10).  
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To conclude this section, it might have been a few decades of smooth and beneficial 
cooperation, but it can be argued that the reason as to why it’s been possible to maintain the 
stability of the relationship for so long, is presumably because of Sweden’s ability to maintain 
the balancing act. It can also be argued that because of this balancing act, China has viewed 
Sweden (and its Scandinavian counterparts) as more easy to deal with than greater states such 
as the US and the UK, and this ultimately highlights how the differences in power are relevant 
in analysing Sweden-China relations. Lastly, it’s also clear that the literature has yet to be 
extended, since current relations evidently is on a decline, which will be further discussed in 
the following subsection. 
 
2.2.3 Changed dynamics 
 
During the past ten years, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (Henceforth the CCP) has 
advanced their methods of controlling information flows and media outlets, not only within 
their own boarders but abroad. The United States, New Zeeland and Taiwan are among 
democracies that in various ways have been targets of Chinese pressure and attempts of 
controlling their media. In 2018, it became evident that Sweden was one of these democracies 
as well. What started with the Chinese embassy in Stockholm criticising Swedish news 
reporting for spreading disinformation about China and portraying the country in an 
unfavourable view, has spiralled into what Jerdén and Bohman (2019) refers to as a 
propaganda campaign aimed towards Sweden, with the Chinese ambassador in the front. The 
criticism from the embassy was followed by accusations that Sweden doesn’t treat their 
Chinese-Swedish citizens according to norms of human rights and that Sweden is anti-China 
(ibid.; Lundqvist, 2019). The Swedish public service news organization, SVT, conducted a 
survey among the eight largest news organization in Sweden on whether they’ve been 
contacted by the Chinese embassy regarding their reporting on China. The results of the 
survey were that six of them had been contacted, and often by the ambassador himself (Kainz 
Rognerud, 2020). Furthermore, the survey showed that journalists have received both 
exhortations and threats, but also invitations to formal meetings to discuss the content of 
certain articles that raises criticism towards the Chinese regime (ibid).  
Another central character in these events is the Chinese-Swedish publisher Gui Minhai, who 
have been held in China since 2015 and was in February 2020 sentenced to 10 years in prison, 
which many are convinced is after publishing books about the personal lives of political 
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leaders in China1. This has sparked outcry in both Swedish and foreign press (Jerdén & 
Bohman, 2019) and the case got even more infected in late 2019, when the Swedish PEN 
Association awarded Minhai the Tucholsky-prize, a prize for persecuted authors and 
publishers. This prompted the Chinese ambassador to release a public announcement, stating 
that there will be diplomatic consequences if the Swedish government allowed for the prize to 
be awarded Gui Minhai (Knutsson, 2019). It was also as late as in December of 2019 that the 
Chinese vice Minister of foreign affairs referred to the Sweden-China relationship as “not 
normal”, an account which the Swedish Minister of foreign affairs, Ann Linde agreed to 
(ibid.).  
 
2.2.4 The free press under pressure 
 
Jerdén and Bohman (2019; 2) argues that it’s possible that the Gui Minhai-case has worked as 
a trigger for the Chinese embassy, but that it’s just as likely that the Chinese government is 
trying to show other democracies in Europe what will or will not be tolerated from a Chinese 
perspective, and to manipulate the public’s view of China. The former being less likely than 
the latter, because although the Gui Minhai-case was, and is to date a well-covered sensitive 
issue in media reporting, it doesn’t explain the same trend in other democracies. As briefly 
mentioned in the previous section, in countries all over the world the CCP are restricting 
unfavourable reporting, conducting cyber-attacks and pressuring reporters and media owners 
to alter content. In Taiwan, for instance, the attempts to influence the free press have been 
systematic since 2008 (Hsu, 2014; Cook, 2013). By placing embedded advertising to spread 
propaganda, pressuring media owners to self-censorship and having tycoons purchasing 
Taiwan media outlets, the Chinese government are seizing the opportunities of Taiwan’s free 
press and open markets (Hsu, 2014; 516-518). In other Asian countries, local governments are 
restricting and punishing reporters for unfavourable reporting of China. One example that 
Cook (2013; 22) describes is Cambodia, who’s state-owned media avoids negative reporting, 
and who’s government also receives considerable amount of aid from China. It is, according 
to Cook not unusual that economic and political incentives play into how reporters, media 
companies and governments handle the pressure to self-censor from China, and rewards and 
punishments are strategically used by Chinese officials. Foreign reporters that don’t adhere to 
 
1 The Chinese government claims that Gui Minhai was being held because of a traffic incident and that his 10-year sentencing is  
based on providing intelligence abroad (PEN International, 2020; SVT Nyheter 2020).  
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the CCP’s demands of pro-China reporting are more frequently denied VISAs and are banned 
from entering China. In some cases, foreign reporters have been threatened and even 
physically assaulted (Cook, 2013; 9-12, 15; Pexton, 2012).  
For the most part, the literature specifically on China exerting pressure on the free press of 
democracies focuses mainly on Chinese propaganda, soft power and public diplomacy. This 
branch of the literature consistently state that China is using soft power to improve its 
international image and to secure foreign interests, which according to Brady (2015) derives 
from China’s historically bad image that has hindered the acceptance from the outside world 
that China seeks. Wilson (2015) and Walker (2016) however, stress that China is practicing 
soft power as a way of counteracting Western democracy and its influence. Walker (2016; 61) 
specifies that China’s aim is not to promote authoritarianism, but to “reshape norms of the 
international order”. This will be further discussed in the following theory chapter.  
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3 Theoretical framework and concepts 
 
In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework that will be used to analyse the data 
presented in chapter five. As have been stated previously, the overall aim of this thesis is to 
explore and examine how power asymmetry affects how Sweden deals with China in their 
diplomatic relations, and specifically how this power asymmetry creates an ambivalence from 
Sweden’s part in this relationship.  
The chosen framework is therefore based on different forms and dimensions of power. Power 
is a crucial concept within political science, because it deals with relations both within states 
and between states. The concepts that form the base of the theoretical framework are the 
concepts of soft power and sharp power, as introduced by Joseph S. Nye (1990) and further 
developed by Christopher Walker (2016, 2018). However, closely related to these two 
concepts are also hard power and normative power. The strength of using this framework is 
that the core concepts, soft/normative and sharp/hard power, enable the analysis of power 
asymmetry between states and the vulnerability of smaller states, in that they expose how the 
concept of power itself is complex and intangible (Nye, 1990), as will be demonstrated in this 
chapter. Moreover, Emma Jeannes (2019) states that hard power “is generally exercised when 
there is an imbalance in a relationship, for example when one party is more dependent or 
weaker than the other party”. Thus, this framework is suitable for analysing Sweden’s 
delicate balancing between upholding internal values and maintaining material interests in 
relation to China.  
 
3.1 New dimensions of power 
 
Joseph S. Nye (1990; 154, 160-162) describes power as the ability to control others into doing 
what they normally wouldn’t do. Traditionally, states’ ability to exert power on others has 
been determined by resources such as military capacity, political stability, territory and natural 
resources. However, modern communication and economic interdependence has made the 
traditional, more costly forms of power less useful. Also, changes in international political 
issues require multilateral cooperation and effective communication to a greater extent than 
military capacity. Nye (ibid.) concludes these changes as a diffusion of power, which brings 
new dimensions to the concept of power and ultimately changes the premise on who possesses 
it. While economic growth is still a power factor, communication and information has become 
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equally, if not more important as traditional means of power (Wilson, 2008; 113). In his 
article from 1990, Nye states that power in the 21st century won’t be derived as much from 
“capital-rich”, as from “information-rich” (1990; 164), and it’s ultimately about “whose story 
wins” (2018; 1).  
 
3.2 Soft power 
 
As interdependence has generated the concept of power to be more elusive, and military and 
economic capacity has been categorized as means of power rather than the only definition, 
being able to depict a favourable view of one’s internal values and policies to the outside 
world is a means of power (Nye, 2018). By adopting the strategy of soft power, a state can 
shape the preferences of others through three primary resources; culture, foreign policies and 
political values (Nye, 2008; 95; Szczudlik-Tatar, 2011; 47). When Nye introduced the concept 
of soft power, he defined it as not coercive in its nature, but that it rather rests on skilful 
persuasion, attraction and seduction to appeal other states in order to achieve policy goals 
(ibid.). It emphasises the values that are expressed in a countries culture, i.e. how it cooperates 
with others and what values underlie national policies and practices (Nye, 2008; 94-96). 
Consequently, by adopting the strategy of soft power, a country can boost its international 
image and gain more allies in the global political arena, by persuading others to want to do 
what you want, without using coercion (ibid.; Walker, 2016; 60-61). Carlson-Rainer (2017) 
describes how Sweden has had great impact in shaping international discourse on human 
rights through soft power diplomacy. She further explains that small states such as Sweden are 
vulnerable to international political instability and conflict and thus have been in the forefront 
of integrating human rights perspective to secure long-term peace and stability. Especially 
Sweden, but also some of its Scandinavian counterparts have through soft power diplomacy 
shaped human rights and peace norms in the global discourse and international affairs. 
However, soft power doesn’t necessarily aim at foreign governments, but rather their 
population, which stresses the importance of culture as a primary resource (ibid.). Different 
forms of cultural exports are ideal tools for soft power, because “Culture is the set of practices 
that create meaning for a society” (Nye, 2008; 96). Thus, cultural exports such as literature, 
education, popular culture and news media are particularly important and effective sources of 
soft power, because they all share the ability to frame global events and issues to the public 
(Bebawi, 2016; 157-158). Education plays an important role in shaping a state’s international 
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image because it enables long-lasting relationships and cooperation between different states, 
involving key individuals and institutions of society. This is usually executed through 
exchange programs, lectures and seminars (Nye, 2008; 101-102).  
 
3.3 From soft to sharp power 
 
Soft power is, as described by Walker (2016; 61-62) a benign form of power, since it’s merely 
a strategy that many states adopt to enhance its international image and general attractiveness. 
Indeed, states have for long used soft power as a tool to gain attractiveness or to reinstate a 
good reputation, such as France, Italy, Germany and the United States before World War 1 
(Nye, 2008; 95-96). As a political institution, the EU is considered to be a normative soft 
power in its attempts to convince both member states and the outside world how powerful the 
normative foreign policy framework of the EU is (Michalski, 2005; 125-127; Nielsen, 2013; 
728).  
However, the same resources and methods can also be used with a more harmful agenda, i.e. 
to manipulate and control, which are characteristics of sharp power. What precisely defines 
sharp power is that it pierces and perforates institutions and political discourse in order to 
distort political environment and public opinion (Walker, 2018; 11-13). It’s not always easy to 
distinguish sharp from soft power, due to similar means of exercising it that can be fairly 
subtle. The fact that soft power involves framing, and that it allows states to give prominence 
to more favourable elements of its culture and practices, makes the lines between soft and 
sharp power blurred at times (Walker, 2018; Nye, 2018; 2). Nye (ibid.) and Walker (2016, 
2020) state the example of CCP-sponsored news that are being broadcasted in multiple 
democracies aimed at non-Chinese audiences. While this is a clear example of soft power, 
however, as soon as content become altered or manipulated, to the extent that it hints towards 
propaganda, it’s sharp power.  
It’s not unexpected that states such as China and Russia are part of the conceptualization of 
sharp power, since elements of strict media control and propaganda are part of authoritarian 
governing. Advanced technology and globalization have enabled such states to spread 
disinformation, surveillance and conduct cyberattacks abroad, in order to restrict regime 
critique similarly as they do at home (Walker et al., 2020; 126-129, 135; Cook, 2013; 8-10). 
Ultimately, it generates an ‘augmented authoritarianism’ and China and Russia are prominent 
figures in this regard (ibid). In addition to spreading disinformation and conducting 
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cyberattacks, methods of sharp power can also be more vivid and less anonymous. For 
instance, direct pressure such as threats or bullying foreign journalists, researchers and public 
officials to self-censorship are other examples of sharp power (Nye, 2018; 1; Walker, 2016; 
58-59). China uses “carrots and sticks”, as Cook (2013) describes it, to control the publishing 
of what they perceive as defamatory content by either denying or delaying visa grants. This 
way, it’s easier to restrict unfavourable reporting and induce self-censorship among journalists 
and publishers.  
As been demonstrated, sharp power works through exerting pressure on specific domains of 
society, specifically those that help shape political expression and public opinion. Walker 
(2018; 12-14) states that the openness of democracies makes them particularly vulnerable to 
sharp power, and further explains that it aims at targeting “sectors that are crucial in 
determining how citizens of democracies understand the world around them” (2018; 12). He 
refers to these sectors as CAMP; culture, academia, media and publishing, which are also the 
sectors through which soft power is channelled. Further, Walker (2018; 9-10) argues that 
democracies have for too long engaged uncritically with China, granting it access to these 
vulnerable sectors. The idea that if western democracies engage in cooperation with 
authoritarian regimes, this would eventually influence the authoritarian regime to be 
influenced by democratic values, has been naïve and has backfired. He states the example of 
Australia, where a deal that would enable broadcasting to Chinese audiences instead resulted 
in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation censoring critique of the CCP (ibid.; 9-10).   
 
3.3.1 Democratic resilience  
 
To stay resilient against sharp power and to protect CAMP-sectors, Walker et al. (2020; 132-
134) as well as Cook (2013; 50) suggest that democracies must reinforce the values on which 
they are built i.e. transparency, the freedom of expression and accountability. Interference in 
these institutions are often carried out through advanced technology, and leaders and civil 
society therefore must gain expertise in how authoritarian states use technology to exercise 
sharp power (ibid.). However, it’s worth noting that this example is stated in a context of 
economies that are still developing, where access to functioning connectivity is limited but the 
demand is high. This creates a different dependency on e.g. China, that can offer developing 
economies these services but at high political costs (ibid.). Developed democracies already 
have technological advances and can detect intrusion and manipulation by foreign powers to a 
greater extent that developing states have. In this regard, one could argue that democratic 
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states already possess skills that decreases their vulnerability. Nevertheless, even though 
government officials and elites might be well aware of sharp power, when the Chinese 
embassy in Sweden exert pressure and influence on independent journalists, one can’t assume 
that sharp power doesn’t influence citizens of a democracy. Consequently, Walker’s (et al. 
2020) argument of transparency is crucial in a journalistic context, because the media informs 
the public.  
Nye (2018) takes a similar standpoint; he argues that when CAMP-sectors are being exploited 
by sharp power tools, democracies should use their transparency and accountability to expose 
these attempts to interfere. More specifically, he argues that shutting down platforms where 
pressure and interference occur is counterproductive. This reasoning builds upon the fact that 
while soft power can enhance the attractiveness of a state, it can also reduce it, especially if 
the line for sharp power is crossed. According to Nye (2018; 2), China could generate more 
soft power if its methods of sharp power were reduced. What Nye then actually suggests is 
that democracies would be guilty of using similar sharp power- methods as China, if they 
choose to dissolve Confucius Institutes, as in the case of Sweden. If such a scenario would 
occur in the specific context of Chinese pressure on journalists, what would the equivalent 
situation look like? Presumably, journalists would then counteract with taking measures of 
discrediting officials, distorting facts or making subtle threats, which are all sharp power 
techniques. Instead, if following Walker et al., Cook and Nye’s model, journalists should 
strive for a neutral, transparent and ethical reporting, and aim towards exposing how China 
uses sharp power to the public. Lastly, collective approaches are crucial in responding to 
sharp power, since regimes behind it benefit from, but also aim at, dividing allies. Specifically 
independent institutions of civil society should seek collective approaches, because they are 
often the targets (Walker, et al. 2020; 133).  
3.4 Power imbalance; Sweden-China 
 
It can be argued that sharp power explains how China is exerting power. However, to analyse 
power asymmetry between Sweden and China, it’s necessary to view the two states as being 
two different forms of power. Wilson (2008; 113-114) describes how neorealists stress the 
importance of traditional hard power as statecraft; military capacity, (economic) sanctions and 
coercive diplomacy (sharp power), i.e. values that are ascribed great powers such as China. In 
contrast, liberal internationalists emphasise soft power as a resource essential for governing 
(ibid.). Sweden, being aligned with the EU’s normative framework of peace, human rights, 
the rule of law and fundamental rights (Manners, 2002; 240-242; Michalski, 2005), and 
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having a long tradition of advocating these, can be argued to be a soft power (Carlson-Rainer, 
2017; Keohane & Nye, 1998; 86).  
 
3.4.1 Interdependence 
 
In Nye’s article on (soft) power (1990; 157-158), he explains how increasing interdependence 
between states implies a mutual dependence that is unevenly balanced. In a scenario between 
a vulnerable state and a less vulnerable state, the less vulnerable and stronger one will use 
threats to obtain power and dominance over the other. However, it’s also likely that the 
stronger and less vulnerable state has limited ability to influence a smaller state with solidly 
organized political institutions. Further, in a relationship between states that share mutually 
beneficial cooperation but differ in strength, the stronger state won’t necessarily benefit from 
exerting pressure on its weaker counterpart (Nye, 1990; 165-166).  
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4 Methodology 
 
This study is a case study and the data will be collected through interviews. AS every method 
has its limitations, the limitations of interviews as chosen method will be discussed in this 
chapter. I also present the process of sampling in relation to respondents and I will clearly 
argue for the relevance of this particular case study. Moreover, the chapter will provide the 
reader with how I will apply the theoretical framework and concepts to my analysis, and a 
discussion on research criteria and ethics.  
 
4.1 Interviews as method 
 
Throughout this chapter, I will argue for the strength of interviews as method, but also 
highlight its limitations. This will be done from a general perspective, as well as from the 
perspective of this particular study. Further, I will in the final sections describe the interview 
structure and how the interviews will be conducted. 
 
4.1.1 Why interviews? 
 
For this study, the data will be collected through elite interviews. In order to fulfil the purpose 
and answer the research questions, interviews are essential, because they enable perspectives 
and knowledge that wouldn’t be accessible through e.g., public documents. More specifically, 
the strength of using interviews are that through the enabled space for reflection and mutual 
discovery, they can provide insights and new knowledge that else wouldn’t have been 
accessible (Tracy, 2013; 132). Using public documents as collecting data was the initial idea 
for the thesis, and it could potentially have provided the study with valuable data, but as the 
purpose and research questions developed it was evident that documents would have been far 
from sufficient. The case of the Chinese embassy’s attempts to influence the Swedish press is 
a fairly new course of events, and most of the accessible public documents related to this issue 
are general strategies of the Swedish government and its China policy, and don’t explicitly 
mention events of this kind. Thus, my research questions and purpose will be approached 
through conducting elite interviews (discussed and defined in section 4.2.2). To characterize 
the form of interviews that will be conducted, I’ve used what Brinkmann and Kvale (2015; 
33) describe as specified interviews, because these interviews aim at describing specific 
situations and actions. However, this form of interviewing also overlooks general opinions of 
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the subject, and this part is not completely accordant with my aim and purpose. I thus also 
adopt a descriptive form of interviewing because these aim at collecting data that is nuanced 
and diverse, in order to learn the respondents experiences and how they have acted in specific 
situations and contexts (ibid.). 
 
4.1.2 Limitations of interviews 
 
Interviews as method undoubtedly has its limitations. Research criteria such as validity, 
reliability and generalizability will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3, but general 
limitations of interviews will be briefly discussed below.  
Typical criticism towards interview research have focused primarily on ethical concerns and 
the issue of subjectivity. Interviews are, above all conversations, within which the participants 
create meaning that ultimately will be interpreted to explain and understand a phenomenon 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 4-6). Naturally, meaning and interpretation brings the discussion 
to biases, and Brinkmann and Kvale (2015; 198-199) discuss the criticism of subjectivity and 
confirm that biases can invalidate a study. However, they also emphasise the strength in 
recognizing biases, because even this can contribute to a “multiperspectival construction of 
knowledge” (2015; 198). Interviews can also be problematic in that they are very time-
consuming and dependent on respondents. Being reliant on respondents can cause problems 
for a study overall, if respondents decide on a short notice to not participate. Likewise, the 
process of finding new respondents or to find respondents that are suitable for the study can 
either slow the process down or make it difficult to conduct the study in the form it was 
initially planned.  
Naturally, it’s also difficult to anticipate the outcome of an interview, and what kind of data it 
will generate. This, however, is as previously mentioned rather a strength, because on one 
hand, it can provide the study with unexpected knowledge, while on the other, it can create 
difficulties in validity. Validity in interviews, as well as most of the criticism on this method, 
is as Brinkmann and Kvale (ibid.) says to a great extent dependent on the craftmanship of the 
researcher/interviewer. Even if the use of the criteria of validity in qualitative research is 
debateable (see section 4.3), it should though be kept in mind throughout the entire process, 
and not solely in the interview process (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 284-285). This is done 
through a continuous checking of the research questions, aims and purpose(s) formulated for 
the study (ibid., 199).  
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4.1.3 Interview structure 
 
Due to the variety of respondents and their different backgrounds and expertise, interviews 
conducted for this study will differ in character, mainly in that the interview guide contains 
specific questions aimed at explaining specific course of events, by which the respondents are 
carefully selected due to their involvement or expertise in the specific case that is this study. 
The interview guide will therefore be altered slightly depending on the respondent. This will 
be discussed further in section 4.2. Tracy (2013; 139) notes that structured interviews are 
often suitable when you wish to compare data in a large sample, but that they are also lacking 
in flexibility, and the interviews will thus be semi-structured and open-ended. As an interview 
in this study proceeds, the questions change in nature from being specific and aiming at 
specific events, to questions that are more reflective in its character and allows the respondent 
to argue and reflect freely. Specifically, the interviews are semi-structured in that they focus 
on respondent’s knowledge and experiences in their lived world, on a chosen topic or theme 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 29, 31).  
 
4.1.4 Mediated interviews 
 
All interviews in this study will be conducted digitally, either by Skype, Zoom or e-mail.2 
Mediated interviews are, after all, slightly different from face-to-face interviews. However, 
mediated interviews are mostly beneficial for several reasons; they are cost-effective and 
time-effective because they don’t dependent on geographical location (Tracy, 2013; 164-165). 
Interviewing through digital devices can also create a safer space for respondents to share 
their experiences and thoughts and ultimately, encourage engagement (ibid.). Most 
importantly, because face-to-face interviews demand more planning and organizing in that 
they require a suitable location that works for all participants, mediated interviews are more 
flexible. Tracy (ibid.) states that this can make potential respondents more inclined to 
participate.  
Some of my interviews are asynchronous, which means that they are conducted through e-
mail or telephone (Tracy, 2013; 164). One of my respondents had limited possibility to 
participate in interviews through Skype or Zoom and preferred to have questions sent to them 
 
2  This thesis is written during the corona pandemic, and while mediated interviews exclusively wouldn’t have been the primary 
choice of conducting the interviews, it is necessary given the circumstances. 
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through e-mail. An advantage of this is that it enables respondents to reflect on their answers 
for a longer period of time, which can make the answers, and ultimately, the data more 
organized. Finally, a benefit with asynchronous interviews are that they are “self-transcribed” 
(ibid.). Naturally, asynchronous interviews conceal facial expressions, emotions and, one 
could argue, the authenticity of respondents personal experiences. However, I don’t consider 
this problematic, since my study doesn’t aim at exploring the respondents’ emotional or 
personal experiences, but rather their professional views, practices and experiences. 
 
4.2 Samples 
 
4.2.1 The case 
 
As Tracy (2013; 230) argues, to achieve quality in qualitative research, one must have a 
relevant and worthy topic. The case of the Chinese embassy’s attempts to influence the 
Swedish press is interesting and relevant for several reasons.  
Firstly, central and most important for this study is the concept of power. China is an 
authoritarian power, whose financial growth and global expansion has earned them great 
power status. Sweden, a small democracy whose domestic economy has benefited greatly 
from its bilateral cooperation with China, is and has been regarded as a ‘humanitarian 
(super)power’. One could argue that Sweden and China represent two ends of a continuum, 
and this indicates the power asymmetry between them. In line with the theoretical framework 
and concepts of this study, China can also be viewed as a sharp or hard power, given their 
economic and military capacity, while Sweden can be considered soft, normative power.  
Secondly, the two countries have, despite these contradicting traits engaged in cooperation 
within a number of fields for decades. As have been discussed in the literature review, 
representatives from both the Swedish and the Chinese government highlight their long 
history of cooperation and have considered each other “old friends”. This is also emphasised 
in the literature on Sweden-China relations, which Michalski (2013) calls a “special 
relationship”. The reason as to why it’s been possible to maintain these friendly ties may be 
because Sweden has kept a low profile on sensitive matters concerning China, i.e. the 
balancing act. With this background, when China is exerting pressure and intervening in 
democratic institutions in Sweden, it’s relevant to further explore the meaning of this alleged 
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special relationship and extend the analysis of the balancing between normative and material 
interests. 
Thirdly, and finally, as the Swedish press is being targeted with pressure from Chinese 
officials, it’s not only serving China’s presumed aim to manipulate the public’s view of China 
and enhance their image internationally (Edney, 2012), it can also potentially undermine one 
crucial body of liberal democracy i.e. the free press, which is the main aim of sharp power 
(Curtis, 2004).  
 
4.2.2 Respondents 
 
For this study, elite interviews will be conducted with journalists from the Swedish press 
corps and researchers within international relations, politics and/or China focused studies. 
Elite interviews refer to interviewing those who are experts or have powerful positions in a 
community (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 171). When conducting elite interviews, it’s 
important to have good knowledge or be well-read within the field of the topic that will be 
discussed in the interviews, but also to have some pre-knowledge about the experts that are 
being interviewed (ibid.). Regarding the researchers that were sampled as respondents, I had 
already gotten familiar with some of their previous work and knew their areas of expertise, 
which is also how I knew that they would be suitable for the study. I argue that interviews 
with journalists are also elite interviews. They are usually tied to larger and established news 
organizations, who have foreign correspondents as well as national political correspondents 
and therefore have access to political domains that others don’t.  
The data in this study is gathered from interviews with six respondents. There were initially 
eight respondents but there was a loss of two. Surely, to have all eight respondents would 
have been preferred but different circumstances in the process of sampling made this difficult. 
Nevertheless, Tracy (2013; 148) mentions that 5-8 respondents is a good rule of thumb to 
achieve “pedagogical value”, but she along with Brinkmann and Kvale (2015; 140) also state 
that the number of respondents is not fixed, and rather depends on how many you need in 
order to answer your research questions and fulfil the purpose of the study. Hence, there will 
be three journalists interviewed and three researchers. Two of the journalists work for two 
well-established news organizations in Sweden, while the third is a freelance journalist and 
active in the organization Swedish PEN. Although there were more journalists initially, I 
argue that the journalistic society in Sweden, at least among the most established news 
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organizations, is fairly homogenous in that neither one has very strong political party 
affiliations and have similar structures. Also, all three journalists work for a journalistic 
organization of some sort and are interviewed as professionals and on behalf of their 
organizations. Further, I’ve chosen to interview journalists because, to a great extent, the 
study relies on information from representatives of this sector, in that they are in the firing line 
of the pressure exerted by the Chinese embassy. Thus, only their perspectives can provide the 
data that is needed in order to answer the research questions. This is, by Tracy (2013; 134) 
categorized as purposeful sampling because respondents are sampled accordingly to the 
research questions and purpose. 
The process of sampling the journalist respondents is primarily based on a survey that was 
conducted by the public service news organization SVT Nyheter (2019). The survey showed 
the news organizations that had been subjected to pressure from the Chinese embassy and 
based on these results I made a first sample of which organizations to contact. Once I began 
the process of reaching out to potential respondents that I knew were connected to the public 
debate on the Chinese embassy’s pressure, I was immediately guided or bridged to someone 
that seemed a better fit, similar to snowball sampling (Tracy, 2013; 136). This was very 
helpful and ultimately made the sample more tailored to the study. In conclusion, all three 
journalists interviewed have first-hand experience of the pressure exerted from the Chinese 
embassy.  
While doing interviews with journalists is undeniably important for this study, I chose to also 
include researchers who had previously conducted research on China. This choice was 
motivated by the fact that researchers can provide a different perspective which is important 
for the research questions and the purpose, i.e. perspectives on power differences between 
Sweden and China and potential policy actions from the Swedish government, in the absence 
of government officials. These respondents were selected due to their previous research on 
China and found through contact with different research institutes. One of these respondents 
have also previously worked with Asia-relations on a governmental level, which I believe can 
provide particularly interesting and relevant data.  
 
4.2.3 Analysing interviews 
 
Rather than using traditional forms of analysing interviews, e.g. discourse analysis, I will be 
applying theoretical reading. More specifically, instead of a systematically interpreting the 
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data, you “reflect theoretically on specific themes of interest.” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 
270). What can be problematic with this form of analysing is the risk of potential bias, in that 
you read through a specific theoretical framework, which is difficult to avoid. However, 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015; 272-273) suggest that you are aware of the risk of bias and read 
your interpretations as the devil’s advocate, i.e. questioning your own interpretations. 
However, this thesis is centrally about power asymmetry and the interview questions are 
therefore created through different concepts and variations of power. Also, Brinkmann and 
Kvale (ibid.) suggest sensitizing when interpreting the interview data, which means that the 
theory guides you to a certain direction, but keeps interpretations open for other perspectives 
and dimensions. 
In figure 1, the interview questions are categorized into themes, that relates to the theoretical 
concepts. More specifically, the table explains a) what themes interview questions are based 
on and what they aim at exploring  b) what characteristics to look for in the data and c) what 
concepts these relate to. It should be noted, that since the respondents are both journalists and 
researchers, the interviews are slightly altered depending on the respondent, however they all 
contain the same themes. 
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Figure 1. Analysis scheme 
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4.3 Research criteria and ethics 
 
Both Tracy (2013; 228-235) and Brinkmann and Kvale (2015; 281-285 ) discuss the 
traditional positivist criteria’s applicability in qualitative research. In short, it is argued that 
these can be ill-suited because they don’t consider contextualized knowledge, social 
construction and exceptionality in events (ibid.). Thus, these arguments along with alternative 
criteria suggested by Tracy will be present in the discussion in this section.  
 
4.3.1 Reliability, validity and generalizability  
 
Studying the case of the Chinese embassy’s attempts to influence the Swedish press poses a 
few challenges. Although the case is relevant, as argued in section 4.2.1, one of the biggest 
challenges is that it’s an on-going and fairly new scenario. This can potentially affect the 
reliability of the study, because as events are unfolding, new knowledge and perspectives may 
arise. Further, this study is conducted in a Swedish context, and I’d argue that with the variety 
of states’ resources, values, political systems and stability in mind, the findings could also 
vary due to these variations. Although journalists in democratic countries surely adhere to 
similar journalistic principles, as well as researchers adhere to the same ethical guidelines, the 
context of the study could matter. Consequently, when using interviews to collect data, it’s 
difficult, or as Tracy (2013; 229) firmly states, problematic to assume that the study would 
generate the same results if it was replicated with different respondents, or simply during 
different circumstances and contexts. Even though respondents have been carefully selected 
because of their knowledge, experiences and relation the specific case, they can’t predict the 
future. Moreover, if the respondents were the same, one can’t assume that they would hold the 
same knowledge or beliefs over time (ibid.). Nevertheless, as mentioned, all respondents were 
carefully selected in relation to the specific case to ensure that the study overall is trustworthy, 
and that it is consistent with the aims, purpose and research questions.  
When the findings of a study can be applied or related to other contexts or to a population at 
large, the study has produced formal generalizability (Tracy, 2013; 229). To produce 
generalizability one should preferably have a large sample (ibid.). However, a large sample 
when doing interviews is time-consuming and I’d argue that a larger sample in this study, 
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despite increasing generalizability, wouldn’t necessarily generate more value or quality to the 
findings and the study as a whole. As argued by Tracy (2013; 230-231), while generalizability 
is important for quantitative research aiming to explain patterns or behaviour on a global or 
societal level, it doesn’t serve the purpose of qualitative research in the same way.  
 
4.3.2 Ethics 
 
There are a few ethical considerations that have guided me in the process of reaching out to 
respondents and conducting the interviews and are in line with Brinkmann and Kvale’s ethical 
guidelines and informed consent (2015; 86-93).  
Firstly, when I contacted potential respondents, I briefly explained the idea and the purpose of 
the thesis and explained that all respondents will be anonymous. Although some of the 
respondents didn’t mind having their names published in the thesis, I concluded that all 
respondents should be anonymous, in order to stay consistent.  
Secondly, I also mentioned that the length of the interview would be kept at a length of 
approximately thirty minutes and that I would ask for their consent to record the interview. 
During the interviews I made sure that the respondents were aware that all recordings would 
be deleted after transcribing.  
Thirdly, I informed all respondents during the interviews that they will be sent the transcribed 
version where I indicate what I would like to use for the analysis. This part of informed 
consent is important from an ethical perspective, because it offers the respondents a chance to 
confirm that the material is true to their articulated statements (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; 
93). All respondents also received questions beforehand.  
Lastly, it should be mentioned that all interviews were conducted in Swedish and are therefore 
translated in the analysis. The process of translating interviews can be challenging, due the 
risk of discrepancies that can occur in this process. Mainly, I discovered that certain 
expressions and idioms could increase the risk of discrepancies in the process of translating. 
However, knowing this it’s easier to avoid this risk and I therefore carefully translated the 
quotes and made sure that they were consistent and coherent to their specific contexts.  
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5 Analysis 
 
Tracy (2013; 139) argues that a strength with semi-structured interviews is that they stimulate 
discussion. As also previously mentioned, the interview guide is not strict, but rather gives a 
point of departure for each question, while they are still connected to each themes presented in 
the previous chapter. Thus, the conversational character in semi-structured interviews can 
bring forward new knowledge and perspectives, which will be apparent when I present and 
analyse the data in this chapter.  
In section 5.1, I present and analyse the data from the interviews with journalists. The focus is 
on how journalists and their respective organizations have responded to the pressure from the 
Chinese embassy and how they view responses on an EU-level. This section is focused on the 
first research question. In section 5.2, the data from the interviews with researchers are 
presented. The main focus will be at the asymmetric power relationship between Sweden and 
China and on Sweden’s balancing between interests, i.e. Sweden’s ambivalence in relations 
with China. Thus, this section is focused on the second research question. 
 
5.1 Journalists 
 
This section is focused primarily on the first research question; 
 
How have journalists from the Swedish press corps internally responded to the pressure 
exerted by the Chinese embassy, and how do they perceive measures to counter this pressure 
on an EU-level? 
 
5.1.1 Responding to pressure 
 
Since the current Chinese ambassador started his services on behalf of the Chinese embassy in 
Stockholm, Swedish journalists have noticed pressure coming from the embassy. The pressure 
aims towards news organizations at large, but also aimed directly towards specific reporters 
that are writing for the organization. One journalist that works for a well-known and well-
established news organization says that they have received multiple letters and e-mails from 
the embassy, and at times been ‘carbon copied’ in e-mail dispatches. Apart from letters and e-
mails, this news organization has also been referred to by the ambassador in interviews and in 
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statements on the embassy’s website. They all contain attacks on the news organization, and 
seem to aim at illegitimating the content, but without naming specific journalists.  
 
 
Respondent #1:” From what I can remember, it has not been about specific names [of 
journalists/reporters] but rather that we are lying, that we are part of a media tyranny and that 
there is no prevailing freedom of expression in Sweden, it’s media tyranny. And that we are 
completely wrong in our reporting of Gui Minhai.” 
 
Similarly, another journalist from another well-established news organization describes that 
they have received remarks and exhortations from the embassy in various forms.  
 
Respondent #2:” sometimes it has occurred in connection to another contact, for example in an 
interview request or during journalistic gatherings /----/. But it has also occurred through 
statements on their [embassy’s] website where they have discredited specific reporters that have 
worked for us and urged us not to publish their work.” 
 
A freelance journalist who is active in the Swedish equivalent to the organization PEN 
International, an association that has been a driving force in the releasing of Gui Minhai, 
describes that they along with other organizations and journalists have received an e-mail 
from the embassy. The e-mail contained what was referred to as the “true” story about Gui 
Minhai and all the offences that he supposedly had committed. This respondent also 
remembers statements on the embassy’s website and press releases that was triggered after 
Swedish PEN organized campaigns and public meetings with other organizations outside the 
Chinese embassy. 
 
Respondent #3:” But the big reaction came when it became official that we were going to 
award Gui Minhai with the Tucholsky-prize. This was in the beginning of November last year. 
Surely, we had expected reactions, but we had not expected the reactions to be that sharp. 
Because at first, we were the ones in the line of fire and the ambassador said these a bit more 
classic things such as ‘those who are responsible for nominating Gui Minhai as prize winner 
won’t be able to feel safe anymore’, he said in an interview.” 
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What the freelance journalist describes is what has also been described in several news media 
surrounding the Tucholsky-prize. He mentions the threats that have been aimed towards the 
Minister for Culture, and that the ambassador threatened that the award will bring 
consequences for the diplomatic relations between Sweden and China.  
On the question regarding how they dealt with and responded to the pressure from the Chinese 
embassy, the same respondent describes that they have taken the threat aimed towards their 
organization seriously;  
 
Respondent #3:” We’ve had to look over part of our security, [it’s] likely that we are still a bit 
sloppy with this, in how we communicate. We have consulted SÄPO [Swedish Security 
Service] on how we should act. They don’t really have more than advice to offer. We are not 
an object of protection; they can’t offer us protection in that regard. Also, we have alarmed 
PEN International, pretty soon after these threats were aimed [at us], a few dozen PEN centres 
worldwide did some very sharp statements in support for us and in protest of China’s handling 
of this.”  
 
Respondent #1 and #2 have taken different actions than Respondent #3, in how they have 
dealt with and responded to the pressure aimed towards their news organizations, presumably 
because the pressure aimed at them weren’t explicit threats. Respondent #1 says that they 
have had editorial discussions that concluded that it’s important that they don’t change their 
overall reporting of China; 
 
” On the contrary, it has resulted in an increased focus on China, and their obvious ambition to 
increase their cultural power in the world. /----/ It has accelerated an increased coverage of 
China and its activities around the world. It is a part of our daily editorial discussions, what our 
journalism should look like and how to maintain our integrity.” 
 
Respondent #2 states that they condemn the attempts of the embassy to influence their 
reporting by emphasising the prevailing freedom of press in Sweden, and further says that;  
 
“We don’t take instructions from the Swedish government nor foreign governments, and we 
definitely won’t cease to use certain reporters just because the [Chinese] ambassador in 
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Sweden doesn’t like what they write. /------/ I think that perhaps they reason that if they keep 
doing this and criticize, attack and suspect etcetera, it would generate a form of self-
censorship, that you back away from certain topics and write less about China and specifically 
about things that are controversial in China, and we must show that it won’t be like that.” 
 
It is also worth noting that both Respondent #1 and #2 add that even though they are 
determined to not let the embassy’s pressure affect their reporting, it gets difficult to maintain 
the same level of coverage when their resistance comes with direct consequences.  
 
Respondent #1:” But we have also become aware through an interview that the ambassador did 
with SVT, that we won’t be granted any visas unless we change our reporting on Gui Minhai. 
So naturally, it affects us in that we can’t go to China to observe, which we would want.” 
Respondent #2:” It might have been at some point where it was trouble with getting visas, for 
example. /---/ that you don’t get a visa or that getting visas suddenly takes a very long time.”  
 
This form of punishment follows the same trend as in similar cases, as described by both 
Cook (2013) and Walker (2016; 9), where using “carrots and sticks” (Cook, 2013; 8) is a way 
of getting media owners, reporters and publishers to self-censor content.  
 
To summarize, all three journalists can give a clear narration of the pressure that has been 
exerted from the Chinese embassy, and how they have managed, dealt with and responded to 
these various forms of pressure. They have adopted one of the approaches that Walker et al. 
(2020) encourages, i.e. to reinforce democratic values, in this case the freedom of press and 
free expression to stay resilient against pressure. The journalists emphasise the autonomy and 
independence of the democratic institution within which they operate, and that they adhere to 
journalistic integrity rather than state power and pressure. These responses to stay resilient to 
the pressure do, however, imply challenges to their continuing reporting on China, because of 
the manipulation of visa grants, which is an expression of China’s punitive foreign policy 
(Cook, 2013; Walker, 2016).  
The more explicit threats communicated from the ambassador, and the attempts from the 
embassy to induce self-censorship are, in fact sharp power (Nye, 2018; Walker, 2018; 13). 
Respondent #3 describes responses that Swedish PEN received after alarming other national 
PEN centres, which is also stated by Walker et al. (2020) is a way of reinforcing democratic 
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values, through uniting civil society. However, and interestingly, the statements on the 
embassy’s website that the respondents mention, could undeniably be interpreted as serious in 
that they discredit the reporting of independent journalists. Yet, they are published within the 
frames of regulation, such as The Freedom of Press Act (1949:105). This raises the main 
concern with sharp power, namely the asymmetry between the unfree and free system, that 
Walker (2018; 17) describes as a facilitator of sharp power. It is, as he states, the openness of 
democracies that makes them exceptionally vulnerable to this kind of pressure from 
authoritarian regimes (ibid.).  
 
5.1.2 Perceptions of international responses 
 
The respondents were asked about the open letter signed by journalists and published by 
Utgivarna (2020), where it is declared that the Swedish government should mark firmly 
against the Chinese embassy’s pressure on the Swedish press. It also states that EU should be 
involved. The respondents were asked if this initiative have generated any effects so far and 
were asked to reflect on what actions or measures they see necessary to deal with increased 
Chinese pressure. This question was asked in order to see if an EU-response was a given 
answer for the respondents and to stimulate reflection on other potential responses. All of the 
respondents were confident that measures on an EU-level were essential, however all three 
also problematized this. 
 
Respondent #1: No, I can’t say that there has been a clear confirmation that this particular call 
or appeal received attention. However, it is important that there is an on-going public debate 
that keeps both UD [The Foreign Ministry] and the EU on their toes in this. /----/ I’m 
personally, and I’m hardly the only one, convinced that action on an EU-level is the only thing 
that will have an effect /----/ and Germany has, even before this appeal, been fairly active and 
has worked towards cooperative action in the Gui Minhai- case.”  
 
However, this respondent also says that the disaccord in the EU that might be problematic; 
 
/--/ that China has invested a lot in some EU-countries creates a financial dependence on China 
and on Chinese investments which perhaps makes the voice of the EU less unified than one 
would wish. But I put great trust in Germany’s firm attitude in these issues.”   
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Respondent #2 doesn’t know if the open letter to the Swedish government has led to anything, 
but still stress the importance of international cooperation.  
 
“It’s mainly that there is international unity, and these issues should probably be handled in the 
EU. Sweden is, after all a very small country and China probably has the idea that Sweden 
would give in to pressure. /--/ and perhaps they conclude that it doesn’t cost them that much to 
try. /---/ but also, that there is transnational cooperation among publicists and that everyone 
really stands up for the free press in democratic countries.”  
 
 
This respondent states that the reason why the EU should be involved is because in terms of 
economy, the EU is comparable to China, which Sweden is not. Further, the respondent states 
the example of how the Chinese ambassador threatened that if the Minister for Culture 
allowed for the Tucholsky-prize to be awarded Gui Minhai, it would severely affect their 
diplomatic exchanges, especially in the absence of international support; 
 
Respondent #2: “China has shown several times that they connect everything. They connect 
trade with the things that are written about the country in the media.”   
 
The answer of both Respondent #1 and Respondent #2 highlights how the power asymmetry 
between two states creates vulnerability for the smaller, more dependent state (Nye, 1990). 
Sweden is, as previously mentioned a small export-dependent state, and both respondent #2 
and #1 argue that Sweden can’t combat the potential long-term implications of the pressure on 
its own.  
 
Lastly, respondent #3 doesn’t know of any concrete actions that has followed the releasing of 
the open letter but mentions the EU and awareness as important responses.  
 
Respondent #3” The EU has, as far as I understand it, difficulties in agreeing on a common 
China-strategy, not least due to different degrees of economic interests among the member 
states. However, I know that the Gui Minhai-case is discussed on the EU-level, so there is 
awareness, but the collective action is still too weak.” 
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This respondent, who was also involved in awarding Gui Minhai the Tucholsky-prize, stresses 
the importance of going against the embassy’s threats and exhortations surrounding it.  
 
 
 
 
“I think it’s a lot about awareness. The principle outcome of the award was that the awareness 
that this is a concern enhanced. I think that previously, authorities, municipalities and 
organizations have gone to China being a little as happy tourists, thinking it’s very exciting 
with many big cities with millions of people and that everything grows so quickly. /----/ But 
what implications come with the fact that an autocratic communist party still governs the 
country? These questions are important for the free speech and the free press.”   
 
Walker et al (2020) and Cook (2013) puts emphasis on learning about how sharp power 
works, and how authoritarian regimes such as China’s use this to obstruct and manipulate. 
They emphasise the importance of being skilful in noticing when these techniques are used by 
foreign powers, not just government officials but the civil society. Respondent #3 captures 
precisely this. By awarding Gui Minhai the prize (in his absence), the public got informed of 
the controversies surrounding it, and the threats and pressure from the Chinese embassy. 
Respondent #3 also adds that during the prize ceremony, political representatives attended. 
 
”/--/ but both the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister and all the political parties 
were very clear [in showing support] in the beginning of November, before the prize ceremony 
and the different political parties and the government showed their support for our right to 
award this prize. And during the ceremony, Ulf Kristersson from the Moderates attended, 
Amanda Lind [Minister for Culture] attended as a representative from the government and 
other parties had sent representatives to show their support.” 
 
Attendance from government officials at events usually attracts press, and especially an event 
that has been surrounded by much media attention and controversy. Consequently, such 
attention helps strengthen civil society, inform the public and is ultimately a counteract to 
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China’s sharp power (ibid.). However, this respondent adds that it’s necessary to involve the 
EU because it’s too easy for China to dismiss the severity of the events in Sweden. Moreover, 
the respondent argues that it’s possible that the pressure on the Swedish press is a way for 
China to test its power on smaller states, and more specifically to move from soft to sharp 
power; 
 
“I think that Utgivarna are correct in that in order for it [measures] to be vigorous, it has to be 
[dealt with] on an EU-level and the EU must find a common strategy. /---/ what happens in 
Sweden is absurdly easy for China to dismiss. /---/ Because we function as a sort of trial 
balloon for a foreign policy where they try to have more sharp power, and not just the softer 
power as earlier.” 
 
In summary, neither of the respondents know of any concrete actions following the open letter 
to the Swedish government, but all three confirm that the best way to deal with the Chinese 
pressure is as suggested by Utgivarna, international unity, especially among the EU and EU 
member states. The respondents are consistent in their arguments that Sweden is a small state, 
and that in order to deal with the pressure that is exerted on behalf of China, a counterpart 
with at least similar (economic) muscles is necessary. However, they also mention the lack of 
accordance in the EU in relation to China’s persistence and assertiveness in its foreign 
policies, in that member states of the EU have benefited greatly from Chinese investments and 
cooperation. It can therefore be argued that responding to Chinese pressure on an EU-level is 
difficult because of the power leverage that China has.  
Walker (2018) states that western democracies have been naïve in witnessing China rising to 
global power, in that they underestimated and miscounted the direction in which it was 
heading. More specifically, he argues that they didn’t foresee the implications of allowing 
China to invest in individual democracies, which in extension led to increased possibilities for 
China to influence the systems within these. Respondent#3 highlights this discussion, with the 
example of cooperation between Sweden and China on local and regional level. This example 
sheds light on the fact that engaging uncritically with China has enabled the transition from 
soft to sharp power to go unnoticed for quite some time. However, through respondent #3’s 
answer, it’s also evident that there is some awareness of this transition, even though the 
general public perhaps don’t view it from the perspective of theoretical concepts of soft and 
sharp power. Nevertheless, the sharp power techniques that the Chinese embassy has adopted 
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are difficult to miss, but as Nye (2008) argues, it’s the transition from soft power to sharp 
power that is subtle and that has been underestimated. Lastly, all three respondents recognize 
how engaging with China on an EU-level has increased the dependence on Chinese economy, 
which one could argue ultimately elevates the discussion on balancing between interests from 
a Swedish context to a European context. 
 
 
5.2 Researchers 
 
This sections deals with the data from the interviews with researchers. It has emphasis on 
Sweden’s relations with China, the balancing act and specifically how these previous relations 
can affect how Sweden will respond to the pressure. Thus, this section aims at answering the 
second research question; 
 
How and to what extent could power asymmetry and Sweden’s previous ambivalence in 
dealing with China affect how Sweden will manage and respond to the pressure from the 
Chinese embassy?  
 
5.2.1 Understanding the pressure 
 
These respondents were first asked about how the Chinese embassy’s pressure on the Swedish 
press can be understood in the context of the supposedly good and special relationship 
between Sweden and China. This question aims at exploring how the pressure from the 
embassy can be understood in a larger context of Sweden and China’s diplomatic history and 
power asymmetry.  
One of the respondents says that there can be two ways of interpreting the pressure from the 
embassy in respect to the historically good ties between Sweden and China, one being that it 
is due to these good relations that this aggressive rhetoric from the embassy has occurred. The 
respondent explains this by saying that there might be a disappointment in Sweden, that 
because of the extensive history and good diplomatic ties, China would expect Sweden to 
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behave differently towards them.  
 
Respondent #4:” One interpretation could be that it’s because of this that China is acting the 
way it is. That there is a disappointment in Sweden; ’We thought Sweden was an old friend, 
and yet they keep harassing us’. However, I’m not sure I believe in this [interpretation]. 
Another interpretation that I believe in more, is that this “friendship” perhaps wasn’t as deep 
after all. If it was, then how could this relationship weaken in a relatively short period of time, 
within so many areas? And it could be favourable to refer to this “friendship”, and that Sweden 
was the first country to initiate diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic [of China], in 
the non-communist Europe. And surely, there have been a bond between Sweden and China, 
and there have been individuals on behalf of both parties that truly have had a genuine 
appreciation and understanding of the counterpart, and within different sectors; politics and 
administration, enterprise, academia and the civil society and so on. /--/ but the fact that the 
relations worsened over the course of a few years’ time, and that the views of China in Sweden 
has worsened, brings me to believe that perhaps this “friendship” wasn’t as deep and stable as 
sometimes portrayed.” 
 
Further, this respondent also says that the rhetoric of referring to each other as “friends” and 
emphasising extensive historical ties is likely part of diplomatic logic.   
 
“I’m not sure that it [the relationship] has been more special than other states’ relationships with 
China. But I think that there is a diplomatic logic on behalf of both parties, and for Sweden to 
emphasise this. Because China is, within many areas, more important to Sweden than Sweden 
is to China. And by highlighting this history, it’s a strategy of saying that Sweden saw to the 
PRC’s interests more than others did. This can in extension help Swedish policy makers show 
their Chinese counterparts that Sweden is a reliable country. /--/ And from China’s 
perspective, it’s generally common to use this vocabulary with “friendship” in a very strategic 
manner, and [to point out] that some forms of criticism of China should be avoided.” 
 
Respondent #6 mentions the rhetoric of being “good, old friends” is a result of the early 
recognition of the PRC but that it doesn’t say much about the pressure from the Chinese 
embassy. Through e-mail correspondence, respondent #6 states the following; 
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“The tension between China and Sweden doesn’t contrast the one between the west and China 
at large, even if there are some important differences between the China policy that is 
conducted on behalf of the US and the one that is conducted by the EU. /---/ The tension 
between Sweden-China relations are particularly great but occurs within the frames of the 
bigger picture of strained relations between China and the west.” 
 
Similarly, Respondent #5 describes that the relationship has previously been depicted in a 
favourable way; Sweden regarded the relationship with China as good, as did China. This 
respondent points out that this has, over the course of the last few years been put in a new 
perspective, as China has become increasingly reactive towards criticism, especially criticism 
from smaller states. Further, this respondent describes that while China’s more aggressive 
responses to criticism about human rights violations is part of a punitive foreign policy, the 
Gui Minhai-case has worked as a trigger in Sweden.  
 
Respondent #5” As I understand it, two things have happened: China has a new self-image and 
has become increasingly more authoritarian. Therefore, criticism towards China concerning 
human rights violations is no longer accepted, and then this particular case with Gui Minhai 
emerged. /---/ China’s self-image has evolved, and Sweden has had to handle a particularly 
difficult case where [Sweden] hasn’t stepped back but has kept supporting Gui Minhai. The 
relations have definitely worsened, that is very clear.” 
 
Carlson-Rainer (2017; 82) mentions that human rights violations are uniquely difficult issues 
to raise with other states, and that it can create friction and jeopardize diplomatic relations. 
What is ultimately described by respondent #5 is that although both Sweden and China have 
emphasised their good relations, China’s increased global power has resulted in China 
viewing itself as too powerful to be criticized. From this perspective, historically successful 
cooperation and good diplomatic ties surely should matter less, especially in a scenario 
between a global great power as China and a small state such as Sweden. However, in this 
scenario, the clash between a powerful, hard power and a less powerful, soft power should 
imply such power asymmetry, that it could be argued that it wouldn’t benefit the more 
powerful counterpart to exert pressure and threats on the smaller, less powerful state.  
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5.2.2 Maintaining balance 
 
This subsection deals with Sweden’s ambivalence, i.e. how Sweden has maintained a 
balancing act concerning interests in relation to China.  
 
Respondent #1:” There has been a balancing act from Sweden’s part. I think that both Social 
Democratic governments as well as Moderate governments have had a pragmatic approach on 
how to deal with China. [Where] you don’t want to sacrifice Swedish interests by angering 
China too much, and this has been possible due to the consensus between the Moderates and 
the Social Democrats during many years. /---/ There has been criticism, but mostly coming 
from smaller parties that haven’t done any claims on governing the Foreign Ministry, such as 
the Liberals. This has enabled the more pragmatic approach and made this balancing act 
manageable. However, this isn’t really the case anymore because this balance is lost./---/ The 
purpose of maintaining the balance from Sweden’s part is to maintain some sort of stability in 
the relationship, a so-called good relationship, as diplomats say. And this is not the case today, 
we have a bad relationship [with China], and to keep a balance between Swedish interests, 
normative interests, economic and geopolitical interests, you maintain a balance in the 
relationship, but this balance in the relationship is lost. It’s not a stable, good relationship 
today, and it makes it harder for people to see why it’s so important to maintain this balancing 
between normative and other interests, because the relationship is already bad. And I think this 
generates the media and politicians in opposition to say that we have to be more tough towards 
China.” 
 
This respondent confirms what has been stated by Michalski (2013; 894-895), that the 
balancing act has been maintained through consensus between the traditional majority parties 
in the Swedish parliament. Moreover, the respondent says that as the balance has been lost, 
the consensus no longer prevails.  
 
”/--/and this enables a more extensive debate on internal policy, which we can see in the 
Moderates, who today advocate a much tougher China-policy than any of the previous 
oppositional parties have done, that I’m aware of, during the last decades.” 
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“When it comes to the ambassador’s criticism of Swedish media and Swedish opinion-
formers, I believe it’s a difficult issue for the government to handle due to the fact that what 
the ambassador is doing lies within the frames of regulated public debate. /--/now, when 
threats and disguised threats against media organizations or even individuals occur, and the 
government’s strategy to deal with this is to say that we have prevailing freedom of speech in 
Sweden, the suggestions from critics so far is to dismiss the ambassador. That is quite extreme 
and nothing that the Moderates wishes either, it’s not realistic. So, the question is; could we try 
something else? However, I think it’s been difficult to deal with this issue, but I also believe 
that even if the balance is lost, you want to recover the balance. [Sweden] still wants to have a 
good relationship with China, and you don’t want to take unnecessary measures that will 
contribute to a further escalation of this conflict.” 
 
The respondent’s statement brings the discussion to what has been done so far. The open letter 
to the government stated that the government should mark more firmly against the pressure, 
i.e. the response thus far had been too timid. The respondent mentions this, stating that the 
government’s response so far, except for summoning the ambassador as reported by Knutsson 
(2019), has been to declare that Swedish media is protected by the freedom of speech and the 
freedom of press. This illustrates the ambivalence, and how Sweden has to carefully balance 
between upholding and defending internal values while maintaining the relationship with 
China. And as respondent #4 argues, this is probably difficult for the government to handle, 
because if measures are too firm, it could trigger more extreme reactions from Chinese 
officials in Sweden, and in extension from China. The respondent mentions that the pressure 
exerted by the ambassador and the embassy are within the frames of regulation, as previously 
argued in section 5.1, and limiting the embassy’s access in any way would contradict internal 
democratic values. Thus, the suggestion that dismissing the ambassador would also be 
counterproductive, which is in line with Nye’s (2008) argument; if democracies restrict the 
access to platforms where soft power can shade into sharp power, democracies themselves can 
be practicing a form of sharp power. 
Respondent #5 explains in more detail how the balancing act has been performed previously 
in the relations between Sweden and China, and ultimately states the same as Lagerkvist et 
al.(2015) and Hellström (2014), namely that seeking support in the EU has been a way for  
Sweden to get out of, what respondent #5 refers to as “the pincher”.  
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Respondent #5” I believe that [Sweden] is still trying to avoid situations where Sweden can 
end up in the line of fire of the aggressiveness in China’s foreign policy./--/ From the Swedish 
perspective, you usually hear demands that the government should raise the issue of China’s 
human rights violations and the Swedish government has tried to respond to this. In a difficult 
situation as this, and the position it puts the government in, you have, on the one hand, wanted 
to respond to the Swedish voices that demand that the Prime Minister should for example raise 
the issue of certain political prisoners. And on the other, you don’t want to anger China, and so 
it has been raised to an EU-level.” 
 
The respondent also says that this has been the case for many European states, and further 
states that  
”Many EU member states have, on the one hand tried to maintain trade relations and their 
more extensive economic ties with China, but on the other tried to raise issues that deals with 
human rights and perhaps even political rights as democracy, on an EU-level. /---/ But then, 
when Sweden ends up in a specific situation, as in the case of Gui Minhai, who has both 
Swedish and Chinese citizenship, [Sweden] has been forced to stick its head out a bit more, 
and then the Chinese reaction has backlashed on Sweden. [Sweden] has tried to seek support 
in dealing with China, from the EU but has still ended up in the firing line. Thus, for Sweden 
to maintain the balance has become increasingly more difficult.” 
 
As presented in the literature review, dealing with the increased pressure from China has 
generated a greater reliance on the EU. This brings the discussion back to the findings of the 
interviews with journalists in section 5.1, where it’s stated that EU member states have 
economic incentives connected to Chinese investments, and that this creates a power 
asymmetry between the EU and China as well. As stated in 5.1, this elevates the balancing act 
from Swedish national level to supranational level. Sweden’s reliance on the EU in order not 
to risk diplomatic ties is surely in the interest of the EU as well, mainly to be able to keep 
promoting the normative framework, but also to ensure economic balance. However, as 
Sweden is a sovereign state, shouldn’t actions be taken on a more national level as well? 
Respondent #5:“/--/ the relations with China must be nurtured, and that’s why it’s difficult 
when the relations worsen. Naturally, this is not in Sweden’s favour, but how should it be 
handled when an increasingly aggressive China insists that even European states should show 
reverence and no longer tolerates criticism?” 
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As have been argued by the researchers previously in this chapter, dealing with China’s 
assertiveness and its sharp power techniques are not an easy task for Sweden, and the above 
statement by Respondent #5 pinpoints the primary question that not only Sweden has to deal 
with, but also many other democracies (Cook, 2013; Walker, 2018). However, the respondent 
reflects on this matter further. The respondent believes that Sweden will deal with the Chinese 
pressure by seeking support at an EU-level, but also describe the issue of the balancing act; 
 
 “The Chinese ambassador has been summoned to the Foreign Ministry several times, both 
regarding Gui Minhai and his behaviour in Sweden. But on the other hand, the Swedish 
government has not publicly criticized China, and perhaps that’s because they are aware that 
China probably will respond with punitive countermeasures./---/ I think that Sweden will 
continue to go through the EU. Then, of course, what is happening in Sweden must be 
responded in some way. However, I believe that [the government] will seek support on an EU-
level and other member states, because you don’t want to be alone against China.” 
 
The respondent adds that Sweden will most likely also keep a greater emphasis on the 
economic ties with China. 
 
“/--/ And the other [way], is to separate issues of human rights, such as the Gui Minhai-case, 
from other forms of collaboration such as trade.”  
 
 
 
It can be concluded that respondent #5 believes that Sweden will, more or less continue a 
similar path, as described by Lagerkvist et al. (2015) and Hellström (2014), which then is the 
same path as recent years. Respondent #4 and #6 has a similar viewpoints; 
 
Respondent #6:” I think the EU is our most important support in this regard.” 
 
This respondent however, also offers a perspective that stands out from previous statements in 
this chapter, namely those institutions in society that aim at advancing methods of detecting 
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intrusion, interference and pressure from foreign powers. Expanding such infrastructure, 
Walker et al. (2020; 134-136) argue, is a crucial part of democratic resilience against sharp 
power.  
Respondent #6:”The strained relationship [between Sweden and China] is part of the bigger 
picture, as I’ve mentioned before and specifically the Gui Minhai-case, which I don’t think 
will be solved quickly or easily. Regarding the Chinese [embassy’s] pressure on the media, 
these must be handled within the frame of a Swedish civil defence against foreign power’s 
operations of pressure and influence. These functions are currently being expanded in the 
Swedish society.” 
 
Respondent #4 problematizes one likely response from the Swedish government, that was 
raised in section 5.1, namely assistance from the EU. 
Respondent #4:” As I understand the situation, Sweden has wanted to ensure that it has the 
EU’s support in releasing Gui Minhai. Some argue that it should have been made into an EU 
issue much earlier. In the current situation, from what I’ve seen, the government’s actions and 
the signals coming from the EU, the EU has not fully stepped up to support Sweden 
concerning the pressure. The signals are not very clear, both in relation to the pressure aimed 
at the government and at journalists.”  
 
Respondent #4 says that one way of interpreting the lack of a clearer support from the EU 
could be because Sweden doesn’t want to have that much support from the EU. The 
respondent explains that this could be due to reluctance within the EU to push for these kinds 
of issues, or that it might provoke further countermeasures from China. 
 
 
 
“It could be an explanation and something that we haven’t seen, that Sweden has tried to seek 
support from the EU earlier, but perhaps there has been a reluctance within the EU 
commission or member states to actively push for these issues. That’s one explanation.” 
 “Sweden doesn’t want to be in the front line of a global resistance towards China./--/ If 
Sweden very actively pushes for this within the EU, it could generate that Sweden puts itself in 
the spotlight, and that can lead to further escalation, i.e. countermeasures from China. So from 
what I’ve seen so far, it doesn’t seem as if Sweden is keen on, very strongly, turning the issue 
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of Chinese pressure against Sweden into an EU-issue.” 
 
Thus, respondent #4 concludes the following scenario; 
”The most likely scenario is that [Swedish government] will continue a similar position as thus 
far; when pressure is aimed at the media, they’ll say that Sweden has prevailing freedom of 
speech and that they will try to avoid untimely efforts to raise the issue to an EU-level.” 
 
Walker et al (2020) states that part of the aims with sharp power is to divide allies. Several of 
the respondents have, throughout this entire chapter, referred to a lack of unity and common 
strategies on how to handle China’s increased assertiveness. Respondent #4 gave a possible 
explanation for the lack of engagement from the EU concerning increased pressure on 
Sweden, which was precisely the potential reluctance from the EU to actively push back on 
China. If the case is as Respondent #4 suggest as a possible explanation, for Sweden, this 
might ultimately mean that they have to remain timid in its response to China’s pressure on 
two fronts; domestically and on an EU-level.  
 
5.2.3 Power asymmetry and its implications 
 
Both Leijonhufvud (2016), Lagerkvist et al. (2015) and Hellström (2014) describe how China 
previously has been eager to learn from Swedish innovations in technology. As China’s 
expertise within this has advanced, the issue of concern would be if the interdependence 
between the two states has changed to the extent that China no longer needs Sweden in this 
regard. An interesting point that Keohane and Nye (1998; 89) makes is that power is held by 
those who can afford to break ties. What they refer to, however, is asymmetrical 
interdependence and the ties they are referring to are trade ties. Nevertheless, it offers an 
interesting parallel to the discussion on Sweden’s ambivalence in its ties with China, due to 
the power asymmetry between the two, and how this power asymmetry can increase if 
interdependence is lost. Respondent #6 discusses this; 
 
“The power balance is naturally to China’s great advantage and I assess China’s sensitivity in 
relation to Sweden as very limited. There are a few issues where China’s relationship with 
Sweden potentially has special features: China is, after all, sensitive to its reputation and 
balances between exerting its newly won global power, although very ungracefully at times, 
 
 
     51  
 
and nurturing its reputation. In this regard, there might be a certain sensitivity in relation to 
Sweden due to the early recognition [of PRC], China’s earlier interest in Swedish social 
solutions and the few remaining areas of Swedish technological advancement where China yet 
haven’t been able to outrival [Sweden]” 
 
Naturally, the hard power is, in general, more favoured by the power leverage it has over the 
small, soft power. However, as will be discussed below, it might not necessarily always be the 
case.  
 
Respondent #5: “China has become increasingly more prominent within technology, but what 
China still wants is good relations to other states, that says precisely the things that it wants to 
hear, that they praise China. Perhaps China then opens up its market and cooperation within 
certain sectors; parts of the economy, areas such as elderly care and social security systems” 
 
This respondent’s account can be argued to complement the previous one, from Respondent 
#6. Apart from environmental technology, if learning about civil services might be part of 
China’s interests, the ties with Sweden surely must be important to maintain. In this case, 
surely it can be argued that China would be ‘learning from the master’, due to the welfare 
state that Sweden is perceived as being. These specific issues aside, Respondent #4 brings the 
focus back to what has been discussed concerning (inter-)dependence and the EU. 
 
Respondent #4:“China’s dependence on investing in Sweden seems to have increased, with 
more Chinese investments now than earlier. And China’s relationship to Sweden doesn’t occur 
isolated from other states, especially in Europe. And China’s relations to Sweden could 
potentially also get affected, even if it hasn’t happened to a great extent, thus far. But it can 
potentially affect the EU’s relations to China. So there is absolutely an interdependence. In 
some ways, one could argue that Sweden is more dependent on China, than the other way 
around, but what is currently happening between Sweden and China attracts attention from 
outside of Sweden’s borders. This is mostly negative attention for China, but that indirectly 
can harm Chinese interests.” 
 
The power asymmetry between Sweden and China has many important dimensions, one being 
that it can be diffused and un-fixed. As Respondent #4 argues in the above citation, the fact 
that China has aggressively exerted its power on Sweden can also lead to an increased 
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suspicion against China. As Hellström (2014; 10) presented, China is sensitive in this regard. 
Increased suspicion towards China can, as Respondent #4 says, generate consequences that 
are harmful to China’s interest, because China is, after all benefited by its cooperation with 
the EU and EU member states (Michalski & Pan, 2015; 6). Nye (1990; 165-166) argues that 
when states that share mutually beneficial cooperation but differ in strength, pressure exerted 
from the stronger counterpart can yet have disadvantageous implications for this counterpart. 
While it can be argued that Sweden is more dependent on China than the other way around, 
but as have been demonstrated in this final section, there is still interdependence in the 
relationship. Consequently, China’s efforts to pressure and influence Swedish journalists and 
the free media, can in the long run be more damaging to China than perhaps it anticipates. 
Finally, in this section the researchers that have been interviewed all discuss how China’s 
sensitivity to criticism is central in the case of the embassy’s pressure. Keohane and Nye 
(1998; 89) argue that reputation is an important element of power in world politics, which also 
emphasise how the pressure can have long-term implications that are not necessarily in 
China’s favour. 
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6 Conclusion, discussion and further studies 
 
In this final chapter, I will answer my research questions and discuss the findings. The chapter 
finishes with suggestions for further studies.  
 
6.1 Research questions 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to gain a deeper and further understanding of power asymmetry 
between Sweden and China, and how this can affect how the case of the Chinese embassy 
exerting pressure on journalists will be managed from a national level. Part of the purpose was 
also to gain and provide insights and knowledge of the Chinese pressure from the perspective 
of Swedish journalists. 
 
RQ 1: How have journalists from the Swedish press corps internally responded to the 
pressure exerted by the Chinese embassy, and how do they perceive measures to counter this 
pressure on an EU-level? 
The journalists that were interviewed for this thesis gave various descriptions of how they, 
and their respective organizations have responded to the pressure from the Chinese embassy. 
Respondent #1 described how the editorial discussion had focused on precisely this and 
concluded that they would keep reporting on both the Gui Minhai-case, as well as on other 
issues regarding China. Specifically, this respondent said that the pressure had rather triggered 
the news organization to increase its reporting.  
Respondent #2 described a similar situation and emphasised the importance of relying on their 
journalistic integrity rather than foreign powers – or domestic powers. Similarly to respondent 
#1, this respondent stressed the importance of continuing to report on China, because the 
obvious aim of the embassy is to induce self-censorship. However, these two journalists also 
described how the pressure from the embassy had interfered with their reporting despite their 
firm responses, in that they no longer attained visas.  
The third journalist that was interviewed didn’t work for a news organization, but for the 
organization Swedish PEN, that awarded Gui Minhai the Tucholsky-prize. This journalist and 
the Swedish PEN organization had received threats that were more serious, to the extent that 
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they consulted SÄPO, the Swedish Security Service, for advice. This journalist also said that 
they alarmed national PEN centres and the International PEN.   
The second part of this question aimed at answering how they perceived measures on an EU-
level. Measures on an EU-level were demanded by the organization Utgivarna in the open 
letter to the Swedish government. All three journalists perceived measures and responses on 
an EU-level as essential in dealing with the pressure exerted from the Chinese embassy 
towards them and their respective organizations. The journalists emphasised how differences 
in power between Sweden and China make it necessary to deal with the Chinese embassy’s 
pressure on a supranational level, mainly because the EU is an institution with similar 
economic muscles. However, all three journalists raised the issue of lack of unity and 
common strategies within the EU. For instance, two of the journalists specifically described 
how Chinese investment have created conflicting interests within the EU, and one journalist 
mentioned how this creates an increased economic dependency on China. In summary, all 
three journalists perceived measures on an EU-level as very important, but not unproblematic. 
 
RQ2: How and to what extent could power asymmetry and Sweden’s previous ambivalence in 
dealing with China affect how Sweden will manage and respond to the pressure from the 
Chinese embassy?  
The conflict that has occurred after the Chinese embassy started to exert pressure on the 
Swedish press corps has generated that the relationship between Sweden and China is bad. 
This imply that Sweden’s balance between upholding internal democratic values and good 
relations with China is lost. However, as Sweden wants to restore balance and maintain good 
relations with China, Sweden will most likely try to keep the same approach as previously and 
thus far. This ultimately means that Sweden is likely to keep a more restrained rhetoric in 
public statements concerning the embassy’s pressure and refer to prevailing freedom of press 
and speech. Furthermore, this will also mean that Sweden will most likely seek support at an 
EU-level, similarly to how Sweden previously has actively pushed normative issues in 
relation to China through the EU, instead of doing this on a national level. However, Sweden 
will likely not seek an untimely and too active support from the EU, to avoid the risk of 
provoking the Chinese embassy, and in extension China, which could ultimately generate 
countermeasures or a further escalation of the conflict. Ultimately, and in summary, it’s very 
likely that Sweden will try to keep a pragmatic approach in managing and responding to the 
pressure exerted from the Chinese embassy, similar to as it has done before. 
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6.2 Concluding discussion 
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the case of the Chinese 
embassy’s pressure is something that Sweden is very unaccustomed to, and something that 
Sweden will most likely be struggling with further on. The balancing act that Sweden has 
maintained in relation to China has most likely hit its most critical point, and the fact that 
China’s rise to power is something that comes with a lot of uncertainty implies that there is 
probably no correct answer on how Sweden should deal with this. When considering the 
findings of this study, particularly those tied to the second research question, it can be 
concluded that no matter which direction Sweden will take, the situation will remain difficult.  
However, it can also be concluded that international unity could be the best strategy for 
Sweden to deal with this issue. What has been consistent throughout the chapter where the 
interview data was presented, is that the power asymmetry between Sweden and China 
implies too much dependency for Sweden on economic interests with China, and by seeking 
support within the EU, this can neutralize the asymmetry.  
Another important conclusion in this study, I argue is that the relationship between Sweden 
and China were probably never more “special” than those between China and other states. If 
the relationship had been as good as have been suggested in the literature, it’s strange how 
China has been so reactive in Sweden. Even if the relationship between Sweden and China 
once was exceptionally good at some point, it then goes to show that all is fair when dealing 
with an authoritarian hard power.  
Another important conclusion drawn from this study is the importance of a strong civil society 
when dealing with authoritarian sharp power. The journalists that were interviewed for this 
study all followed the same countermeasures as Walker et al. (2020) argued would increase 
democratic resilience. 
 
6.3 Future studies 
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Future studies should preferably be focused on the internal discourse of the Swedish 
parliament, from the time when the pressure from the Chinese embassy started until a few 
years ahead. It would be interesting to see how the balancing act takes form in this context, 
and what arguments underlie those in favour of a tougher policy on China and what arguments 
underlie those who oppose. 
 Also, since this study was conducted during the Corona pandemic, it would be interesting to 
see if, and how this has affected Sweden-China relations from different perspectives.  
Lastly, this study was difficult to conduct in that it studied a case that is still on-going, which 
has the down-side that it generates speculations based on certain aspects, such as theoretical 
presumptions or previous cases. Thus, studies that focuses on the pressure from the embassy 
and Sweden’s responses from a retrospective perspective would be particularly interesting. 
Surely, there are no indications that the pressure from Chinese officials would suddenly stop, 
but to track the Swedish governments responses for a certain period of time would certainly 
extend the research on Swedish-China relations, and particularly that on Sweden’s 
ambivalence in dealing with China. 
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8 Appendix.  
 
Interview guide 
This interview guide contains all questions asked, both those asked journalists and those asked 
researchers. The interviews were semi-structured, and follow-up questions could therefore 
occur that are not included in this interview guide. Some questions were specific in relation to 
the respondent, all respondents were anonymous, and I have for ethical reasons decided to 
exclude those.  
 
1. Can you describe the pressure from the Chinese embassy; character, scope, in what form? 
 
 
2. How have you and [your organization] responded and handled this? 
 
 
3. Research literature on Sweden’s relations with China emphasise how important these relations have 
been in terms of economy and politics. Representatives from both countries have highlighted that 
they are “old friends” and some literature also indicate that this relationship has been special. Yet, 
China has had a very aggressive rhetoric towards Sweden through threats and pressure on 
journalists. How can this be interpreted? Why isn’t Sweden spared? 
 
4. Literature on Sweden-China relations also describe Sweden’s relations towards China as a balancing 
act, in that Sweden has kept a low profile on sensitive matters concerning China. How could this 
come to affect how Sweden will respond and deal with the Chinese pressure on Swedish media? 
 
 
5. How do you think that the Swedish government will react to the pressure, if it continues?  
 
 
6. China has previously received aid Sweden and has benefited from Swedish knowledge in e.g. 
technology. Now China is an authoritarian great power and Sweden still a small export-dependent 
democracy and described as a humanitarian great power. How do you perceive this relationship in 
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terms of power? Are China still benefited from cooperation with Sweden?  
 
 
7. The organization Utgivarna received an open letter to the Swedish government, stating that the 
government should mark firmly against the pressure from the Chinese embassy, and also state that it 
should be dealt with on an EU-level, what are your thoughts on this/in what way can EU assist/ 
other alternatives? 
 
 
